I investigate the optimal environmental tax under a policy based on extended producer responsibility (EPR) in oligopoly markets. I introduce the recycling market and explicitly consider how these policies affect the incentive for recycling. I derive the optimal tax rule, which depends on the...

I investigate the optimal environmental tax under a policy based on extended producer responsibility (EPR) in oligopoly markets. I introduce the recycling market and explicitly consider how these policies affect the incentive for recycling. I derive the optimal tax rule, which depends on the...

This paper analyzes a random-proposer coalitional bargaining game with different discount factors, which is a generalized version of Okada's (1996) model. We consider limit subgame efficiency which means that when the discount factors are sufficiently close to unity, the full coalition is formed...

This paper investigates a generalized Baron-Ferejohn model with different discount factors, different recognition probabilities and q-majority rule. In the paper, it is shown that if players are sufficiently patient, recognition probabilities are similar and the voting rule is not unanimous,...

This paper analyzes a random-proposer coalitional bargaining game with different discount factors, which is a generalized version of Okada's (1996) model. We consider limit subgame efficiency which means that when the discount factors are sufficiently close to unity, the full coalition is formed...

This paper investigates a generalized Baron-Ferejohn model with different discount factors, different recognition probabilities and q-majority rule. In the paper, it is shown that if players are sufficiently patient, recognition probabilities are similar and the voting rule is not unanimous,...