In this paper, we study a notion of sufficient input, i.e. input that allows to produce at least one unit of output when the other inputs are fixed at any positive level. We show that such an input allows to produce any positive amount of production. The main property of sufficient inputs is as...

In this paper, we study a notion of sufficient input, i.e. input that allows to produce at least one unit of output when the other inputs are fixed at any positive level. We show that such an input allows to produce any positive amount of production. The main property of sufficient inputs is as...

In this paper, we investigate the impact of leadership in a tax competition game. We show that leadership by a group of countries is pareto improving for each country (leaders and followers) compared to a Nash equilibrium outcome. In addition, a coalition of leaders is also pareto improving and...

The benefit function, introduced by Luenberger, provides a tool for well-defined cardinal comparisons of different bundles of goods. It also allows to study in an orignal way optimal consumers and firms choices, Pareto-optimality etc... In this note we prove that the benefit function is...

The proposition 1 of our paper "On the differentiability of the benefit function" (Economics Bulletin, March, 24) is incorrect under the assumption 1. We provide two alternative versions of this assumption under which the statement of proposition 1 holds true.

The proposition 1 of our paper "On the differentiability of the benefit function" (Economics Bulletin, March, 24) is incorrect under the assumption 1. We provide two alternative versions of this assumption under which the statement of proposition 1 holds true.

The benefit function, introduced by Luenberger, provides a tool for well-defined cardinal comparisons of different bundles of goods. It also allows to study in an orignal way optimal consumers and firms choices, Pareto-optimality etc... In this note we prove that the benefit function is...

This note presents a model in which pension funds, by holding a significant share of capital assets, can exert a non competitive behavior on labor market. This leads to lower wages and higher capital returns, and can reduce capital accumulation and long-run welfare.

This note presents a model in which pension funds, by holding a significant share of capital assets, can exert a non competitive behavior on labor market. This leads to lower wages and higher capital returns, and can reduce capital accumulation and long-run welfare.