In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two...

This paper characterizes optimal mechanisms facilitating the cost sharing and the selection of a provider for a club good. These mechanisms are allocatively and Pareto efficient. However, it appears that transfers occur even when the good is not provided. This result is due to the weakening of...

This paper considers a voluntary contribution threshold game in which a group benefit is realized only if the number of contributors at least reaches a threshold level, and analyzes the effect of the threshold level on the likelihood that the group benefit is realized. Changes in the threshold...

It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as...

A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker's payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an...

In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two...

This paper considers a voluntary contribution threshold game in which a group benefit is realized only if the number of contributors at least reaches a threshold level, and analyzes the effect of the threshold level on the likelihood that the group benefit is realized. Changes in the threshold...

This paper characterizes optimal mechanisms facilitating the cost sharing and the selection of a provider for a club good. These mechanisms are allocatively and Pareto efficient. However, it appears that transfers occur even when the good is not provided. This result is due to the weakening of...

It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as...

This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjostrom, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) in discrete public good economies with quasi-linear preferences. We find that only constant social choice functions are securely...