Some papers have disputed when cost differentials among privately provided public goods make income transfer policy effective. This paper clarifies the different assumptions underlying this disputation and shows that original cost equalization is a necessary and sufficient condition to hold the...

In this note we analyse the provision of a pure public good with non constant production cost in the context of a federation of jurisdictions with two tiers of Government: the central and the local. The central government aims at welfare maximization but this objective is constrained to the use...

Some papers have disputed when cost differentials among privately provided public goods make income transfer policy effective. This paper clarifies the different assumptions underlying this disputation and shows that original cost equalization is a necessary and sufficient condition to hold the...

This note shows that if commodities are tradable across jurisdictions, then it may be efficient to have heterogeneously sized jurisdictions, even if (i) consumers are identical, (ii) there is one private good and one public good, (iii) utility and production functions are not affected by...

In this paper we provide a theoretical analysis of transfer sharing in a federalist economy by means of bargaining among regions and the federal government. The federal government could decide either to negotiate simultaneously with each region (bilateral negotiation), to negotiate with all...

In this paper, we investigate the impact of leadership in a tax competition game. We show that leadership by a group of countries is pareto improving for each country (leaders and followers) compared to a Nash equilibrium outcome. In addition, a coalition of leaders is also pareto improving and...

This paper argues that there is no race to the bottom when the social planner adopts a Rawlsian criterion, only the poor are mobile and they do not work at the optimal tax outcome. This argument is developed within a two skill-model of optimal income taxation.

This paper argues that there is no race to the bottom when the social planner adopts a Rawlsian criterion, only the poor are mobile and they do not work at the optimal tax outcome. This argument is developed within a two skill-model of optimal income taxation.

During and immediately after the recessions of 2001 and 2007-2009, tax amnesties in the American states rebounded in popularity. Is tax amnesty a good fiscal policy? To address this question, we review the experience of US state tax amnesty between 1982 and 2012 and identify the literature that...

In this paper we provide a theoretical analysis of transfer sharing in a federalist economy by means of bargaining among regions and the federal government. The federal government could decide either to negotiate simultaneously with each region (bilateral negotiation), to negotiate with all...