This paper analyzes optimal nonlinear pricing of a congestible network good. In contrast to the traditional efficiency-on-the-top result in the standard screening model, we show that the presence of a delay cost borne by users leads to upward distortions in consumption for the high-demand users.

By allowing the initial prior over market size to be a mixture of distributions, this paper extends the model of irreversible investment under uncertainty proposed by Rob (1991). We find that capacity expansion fuels investors' optimism. It is shown in the paper that the crash is always preceded...

This paper analyzes optimal nonlinear pricing of a congestible network good. In contrast to the traditional efficiency-on-the-top result in the standard screening model, we show that the presence of a delay cost borne by users leads to upward distortions in consumption for the high-demand users.

Competing firms are usually better informed about their own cost parameters than about those of their rivals. Therefore, it is an important issue to study the incentives of firms to exchange private cost information. We resolve and further generalize an influential model of Raith (1996) and show...

This paper studies a producer's quality choice of an information good. The marginal cost of quality provision for the good is decreasing. The buyer does not observe the actual quality but can learn a signal which is the sum of quality and a noise. It shows that the producer has an incentive to...

By allowing the initial prior over market size to be a mixture of distributions, this paper extends the model of irreversible investment under uncertainty proposed by Rob (1991). We find that capacity expansion fuels investors' optimism. It is shown in the paper that the crash is always preceded...

Competing firms are usually better informed about their own cost parameters than about those of their rivals. Therefore, it is an important issue to study the incentives of firms to exchange private cost information. We resolve and further generalize an influential model of Raith (1996) and show...

This paper studies a producer's quality choice of an information good. The marginal cost of quality provision for the good is decreasing. The buyer does not observe the actual quality but can learn a signal which is the sum of quality and a noise. It shows that the producer has an incentive to...

To spur innovation, the patent protection system grants the patentee limited monopoly power to recoup his R&D investment, although, in general, allowing the use of the public good "innovation" is socially efficient. But patents and patent threats can also be used strategically, e.g. to deter...