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Learning in Tournaments with Inter-Generational Advice

Chaudhuri, Ananish; Sopher, Barry; Schotter, Andrew - In: Economics Bulletin 3 (2006) 26, pp. 1-16

) receive advice from that predecessor via free-form messages that generation t players leave for their generation t+1 … successors. We find that the presence of advice makes a difference in that the experimental groups who get advice perform better … with no recourse to such advice. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196499

Peer advice in a tax-evasion experiment

Wakolbinger, Florian; Haigner, Stefan Daniel - In: Economics Bulletin 29 (2009) 3, pp. 1653-1669

We examine peer effects in a tax-evasion experiment where subjects receive either advice or compliance data from …. Receiving advice or compliance data from the pool of low-compliance participants yields the lowest compliance rates. We show … that advice has a slightly bigger impact than observing the compliance of others and that subjects focus on payoff …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008563050

The Uncontrolled Social Utility Hypothesis Revisited

Schmidt, Carsten; Ro'i Zultan - In: Economics Bulletin 3 (2005) 33, pp. 1-7

The experiment disentangles communication and social effect in face-to-face communication. The results question the previous interpretation of communication effects in ultimatum bargaining, and suggest that separate processes, both of a strategic and of an affective-social nature induce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005416806

Comparing Guessing Games with homogeneous and heterogeneous players: Experimental results and a CH explanation

Kovac, Eugen; Vojtek, Martin; Ortmann, Andreas - In: Economics Bulletin 3 (2008) 9, pp. 1-9

We investigate the decisions of individuals in simple and complex environments. We use a version of the Guessing Game (Beauty-contest Game) as a vehicle for our investigation, employing mathematically talented students. We find that our subjects think in complex environments more carefully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010835751

An Experiment on Waiting Time and Punishing Behavior

Galeotti, Fabio - In: Economics Bulletin 33 (2013) 2, pp. 1383-1389

We investigate the implications of waiting time on the decision to punish in a power-to-take experiment. We find that (a) waiting reduces the overall probability of destroying and (b) responders destroy more often in response to higher take rates when the waiting time is longer.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010835937

Drift and equilibrium selection with human and computer players

Ricciuti, Roberto; Innocenti, Alessandro; Caminati, Mauro - In: Economics Bulletin 3 (2008) 19, pp. 1-7

The theory of drift (Binmore and Samuelson 1999) concerns equilibrium selection in which second-order disturbances may have first-order effects in the emergence of one equilibrium over the other. We provided experimental evidence with human players supporting the model in Caminati, Innocenti and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010835981

The Uncontrolled Social Utility Hypothesis Revisited

Schmidt, Carsten; Ro'i Zultan - In: Economics Bulletin 3 (2005) 33, pp. 1-7

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836065

Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to a public good

Chaudhuri, Ananish; Paichayontvijit, Tirnud - In: Economics Bulletin 3 (2006) 8, pp. 1-14

We explore facets of conditional cooperation in a public goods game. First, we replicate the Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) result that the majority of subjects in public goods experiments are conditional cooperators. Next, given that the majority of subjects in our study are conditional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094638

Comparing Guessing Games with homogeneous and heterogeneous players: Experimental results and a CH explanation

Kovac, Eugen; Vojtek, Martin; Ortmann, Andreas - In: Economics Bulletin 3 (2008) 9, pp. 1-9

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094705

Common and almost common knowledge of credible assignments in a coordination game

Chaudhuri, Ananish; Zhou, Chenan; Prak, Parapin; … - In: Economics Bulletin 3 (2006) 1, pp. 1-10

We build on Van Huyck, Gillette and Battalio (1992) and examine the efficacy of credible assignments in a stag-hunt type coordination game with two Pareto-ranked equilibria, one payoff dominant and the other risk dominant. The majority of our subjects fail to coordinate to the payoff dominant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094760