This paper proves the existence of non-empty cores for directed network problems with quotas and for those combinatorial allocation problems which permit only exclusive allocations.

The spatial voting approach is extended to account for the existence of a loyalty effect driving the choice of parties' platforms during elections. There emerges a non-linear relationship between these variable, whereby a party sticking to its historical heritage may lose to a rival more keen to...

I discuss a scenario in which second expert opinions may not benefit decision making. The introduction of a second expert s the possibility of partisan bickering, which impairs information transmission.

We consider the problem of selecting a subset of a feasible set over which each agent has a strict preference. We propose an invariance property, converse reduction-consistency, which is the converse of reduction-consistency introduced by Yeh (2006), and study its implications. Our results are...

Condorcet's paradox is one of the most prominent results in social choice theory. It says that there may not exist any alternative that a net majority prefers over every other alternative. When outcomes need not be deterministic alternatives, we show that a similar paradox still exists even if...

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper shows that the paradox has...

We consider two-player integer allocation plms and provide axiomatic characterizations of adaptations of the Nash (1950) an Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) solutions fo such problems. We also relate the theory dveloped for integer allocation problems, to the problem of fair allocation of indivisible...

In this note we study the centralization vs. decentralization issue for the management of a given collective activity. The aim is to characterize a class of decision rules that guarantees the stability of global cooperation (i.e centralization) against the incentive of coalitions of citizens to...