Similar Search Results

Productivity and the product scope of multi-product firms: a test of Feenstra-Ma

Raff, Horst; Wagner, Joachim - In: Economics Bulletin 33 (2013) 1, pp. 415-419

Feenstra and Ma (2008) develop a monopolistic competition model where firms choose their optimal product scope by balancing the profits from a new variety against the costs of “cannibalizing” sales of existing varieties. While more productive firms always have a higher market share, there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278541

Vertical differentiation and labor market: the differentiation principle revisited

Hili, Amal; Lahmandi-Ayed, Rim; Lasram, Hejer - In: Economics Bulletin 35 (2015) 1, pp. 633-640

The labor market is introduced into the standard vertical differentiation model, linking increasingly the quality of the product and the effort necessary for workers to produce it. Surprisingly, when two firms compete on the product market but are monopolies on the labor market, at equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011207122

Market coverage and the nature of product differentiation: a note

Wauthy, Xavier Y - In: Economics Bulletin 30 (2010) 2, pp. 1129-1136

In this note, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of pricing games with product differentiation in relation with the extent of market coverage. It is a received idea in the IO literature that the horizontal and vertical models of product differentiation are almost formally equivalent. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509902

Exclusive contracts with vertically differentiated products

Bakó, Barna - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 2, pp. 1312-1319

In this paper we develop a simple model to analyze the effects of exclusive contracts in vertically integrated markets where both the upstream and the downstream market are characterized as oligopolies and manufacturers produce vertically differentiated products. We find that firms prefer to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278746

On the tacit collusion equilibria of a dynamic duopoly investment game

Ruble, Richard; Versaevel, Bruno - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 4, pp. 2817-2827

This note extends the characterization of simultaneous investment (tacit collusion) equilibria in Boyer, Lasserre and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278742

Optimal pricing of postal services under endogenously determined entry

Currier, Kevin M. - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 4, pp. 3503-3511

FMO, several authors suggest that the sale of access to competitive entrants may provide the universal service provider … conditions under which competitive entry via access is welfare superior to entry via bypass (the Theorem on the Superiority of … Access). In this paper, we show that in the single product context, the Laspeyres price cap-based regulatory adjustment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278518

Preemptive acquisition and downgrading innovation.

Tarola, Ornella - In: Economics Bulletin 31 (2011) 2, pp. 1520-1529

Research papers on innovation activity share the view that whenever an invention is made available by a startup innovator, getting its ownership by acquisition is beneficial for incumbent firms. In this note, I show by means of an example that there are some circumstances in which accomodating...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024427

Monopolistic price discrimination and output effect under conditions of constant elasticity demand

Aguirre, Iñaki - In: Economics Bulletin 4 (2006) 23, pp. 1-6

The paper proves that monopolistic price discrimination increases output under conditions of constant demand elasticity. The demonstration is simpler than that of Formby, Layson and Smith (1983)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005416815

Bundling by Competitors and the Sharing of Profits

Ginsburgh, Victor; Zang, Israel - In: Economics Bulletin 12 (2007) 16, pp. 1-9

We discuss the effects of bundling two goods offered by two symmetric firms. This situation requires the use of some sharing rule for the profits from the sales of the bundle. We show that the choice of this rule may have substantial effects on prices and profits â€“ even if the possible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005416831

How to control market power of activity centers? A theoretical model showing the advantages of implementing competition within organizations

Vieira, Pedro Cosme; Pereira, Samuel - In: Economics Bulletin 7 (2007) 6, pp. 1-8

One important issue in firms' governance is how to incentives so that activity centres can become more efficient. In this paper, we first introduce an agency contract where the salary of the manager of an activity centre that produces an intermediate product is dependent of its performance....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005416832