We model the toilet seat problem as a 2 player non-cooperative game. We find that the social norm of leaving the toilet seat down is inefficient. However, to the dismay of “mankind”, we also find that the social norm of leaving the seat down after use is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium....

This paper investigates the price behavior in an experimental market in which participants are only aware of their own private values and do not possess information about the demand and supply curves, hence face ambiguity. The paper finds that when demand is flatter (more elastic) than the...

This paper investigates the price behavior in an experimental market in which participants are only aware of their own private values and do not possess information about the demand and supply curves, hence face ambiguity. The paper finds that when demand is flatter (more elastic) than the...

We model the toilet seat problem as a 2 player non-cooperative game. We find that the social norm of leaving the toilet seat down is inefficient. However, to the dismay of “mankindâ€, we also find that the social norm of leaving the seat down after use is a trembling-hand perfect...