In this paper, we investigate the impact of leadership in a tax competition game. We show that leadership by a group of countries is pareto improving for each country (leaders and followers) compared to a Nash equilibrium outcome. In addition, a coalition of leaders is also pareto improving and...

In this paper, we study a notion of sufficient input, i.e. input that allows to produce at least one unit of output when the other inputs are fixed at any positive level. We show that such an input allows to produce any positive amount of production. The main property of sufficient inputs is as...

This note presents a model in which pension funds, by holding a significant share of capital assets, can exert a non competitive behavior on labor market. This leads to lower wages and higher capital returns, and can reduce capital accumulation and long-run welfare.

In this paper, we study a notion of sufficient input, i.e. input that allows to produce at least one unit of output when the other inputs are fixed at any positive level. We show that such an input allows to produce any positive amount of production. The main property of sufficient inputs is as...

This note presents a model in which pension funds, by holding a significant share of capital assets, can exert a non competitive behavior on labor market. This leads to lower wages and higher capital returns, and can reduce capital accumulation and long-run welfare.