This paper derives a dynamic cost-benefit rule for evaluating large projects. We show that, in addition to the conventional income and consumer surplus measures, the rule also entails an extra term involving capital cost changes.

We find that the actual willingness to pay for various consumer goods can be manipulated by an uninformative anchor, replicating Ariely et al. (2003). We furthermore demonstrate that the anchoring effect decreases but does not vanish with higher cognitive ability.

Gneezy [Gneezy, U., 2005. Deception: the role of consequences. American Economic Review 95, 384-394.] recently showed that lying is costly. Using the same experimental design we test whether there is a gender difference in deception. We find that men are significantly more likely than women to...

In a one-shot Prisoners’ dilemma experiment, female participants are highly sensitive to the social frame. Male participants are not.