We visit the role of privatization in the location decision of firms in an industry where no firm can produce all varieties demanded. We demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, in the presence of a publicly owned firm, notwithstanding the degree of privatization.

We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial competition, to the vertical structure of an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded.

We show how, in an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded, a vertical merger with a monopoly upstream will induce each downstream firm (inside and out of the merger) to deviate from the socially optimal location.

In this paper I present evidence indicating systematic differences in costs of adjustment associated with the introduction of new capital across groups of firms that differ in the factor-intensity of their products.

We construct a model of exchange rate target zones that allows the stochastic process, with a closed-form general solution, to include the possibility of lagged response of fundamentals.

We look at the implications of a cross-border merger upstream in a vertically related industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded.