We revisit Maxwell's (1998) analysis to show that his results are incompatible with the assumption of full market coverage. As a consequence, the effects of MQS regulation on the high-quality firm's incentive to adopt a more efficient technology cannot be assessed in this model.

We treat instructions as an experimental variable to study how their format affects the participants’ comprehension, speed of play, and experimental behavior. We find that, in a public good game, short on-screen instructions requiring forced inputs improve on subjects’ comprehension and...

Survey data show that subjects positively discount both gains and losses but discount gains more heavily than losses. This holds for monetary and non-monetary outcomes. These results do not confirm the findings of two earlier studies about negative time preferences for non-monetary outcomes.

A well established belief both in the game-theoretic IO and in policy debates is that market concentration facilitates collusion. We show that this piece of conventional wisdom relies upon the assumption of profit-seeking behaviour, for it may be reversed when firms pursue other plausible goals....

We model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame, perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leader’s...