In a bargaining setting with asymmetrically informed, inequity-averse parties, a fully efficient mechanism (i.e., the double auction) exists if and only if compassion is strong. Less compassionate parties do not trade in the double auction in the limit of strong envy.

Firms compete for a contract and subcontract part of the work. If subcontracting takes place before the award of the contract, the revenue equivalence result breaks down, as subcontractors anticipate that their bids influence the probability of the firm winning the contract. Properties of the...

We use matched survey and administrative data to study interviewer and interview related determinants of misreporting on welfare receipt in interviews. In our data, 12.2 % of German welfare recipients underreport benefit receipt. We find that underreporting is more likely in formal and...

We use Swiss data to test whether intergenerational educational mobility is affected by the age at which children first enter (primary) school. Early age at school entry significantly affects mobility and reduces the relative advantage of children of better educated parents.