This note gives the conditions on preferences to guarantee the monotonicity of asset prices when the payoffs of the risky asset change in the sense of the Nth stochastic dominance and with an Nth degree increase in risk. Those conditions are expressed in terms of the sign of the successive...

This study establishes necessary conditions for Almost Stochastic Dominance criteria of various orders. These conditions take the form of restrictions on algebraic combinations of moments of the probability distributions in question. The relevant set of conditions depends on the relevant order...

This note provides an alternative derivation of the leximin principle using the framework of Harsanyi’s (1953) equi-probability model. We demonstrate that the leximin principle is concluded if and only if the preference ordering of the impartial observer obeys strong monotonicity and complete...

The utility premium is generally defined as the pain or reduction in expected utility caused by an nth-degree risk increase, where n≥2. While it is a very useful concept in understanding a decision maker’s choice in uncertain situations, the utility premium is not interpersonally comparable....

When risk averse forecasters are presented with risk neutral proper scoring rules, they report probabilities whose ratios are shaded towards 1. If elicited probabilities are used as inputs to decision-making, naive elicitors may violate first-order stochastic dominance.

A stag-hunt game (with the risky and safe actions) has two pure Nash equilibria that are Pareto-rankable. The risky action leads either to the Pareto-superior equilibrium (high payoff) or to out of equilibrium (low payoff) depending on the opponent’s action. Both players may want to obtain...

We endogenize the trading mechanism selection in a model of directed search with risk averse buyers and show that the unique symmetric equilibrium entails all sellers using fixed price trading. Mechanisms that prescribe the sale price as a function of the realized demand (auctions, bargaining,...

Estimates of agents’ risk aversion differ between market studies and experimental studies. We demonstrate that these estimates can be reconciled through consistent treatment of agents’ propensity for narrow framing.

In this letter, we show that the results presented by Jindapon and Neilson (2007) for changes in risk à la Ekern (1980) can be generalized to mean-preserving stochastic dominance changes, with appropriate and simple additional conditions on the utility function.

When bidders have different risk aversion levels, we determine in a first-price auction, the asymmetric equilibrium strategies. We analyze the impact of asymmetric risk aversion levels on bidders’ markups and on the expected revenue and allocative efficiency of the auction.