This paper examines the role of habit formation in a standard state-dependent pricing (SDP) model. Incorporating habit formation helps the SDP model to generate hump-shaped and more persistent output responses under a monetary shock. More importantly, incorporating habit formation causes...

We let subjects take risky decisions that affect themselves and a passive recipient. Adding a requirement to justify their choices significantly reduces loss aversion. This indicates that such an accountability mechanism may be effective at debiasing loss aversion in agency relations.

We analyze a task-assignment model in which a principal assigns a task to one of two agents depending on future states. If the agents have concave utility, the principal assigns the task to them contingent on the state. We show that if the agents are loss averse, a state-independent...

Studies of micro-level price datasets find more frequent small price increases than decreases, which can be explained by consumer inattention because time-constrained shoppers might ignore small price changes. Recent empirical studies of the link between shopping behavior and price attention...

We modify the classic single-period inventory management problem by assuming that the newsvendor is expectation-based loss averse according to  Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We show that the expectation-based loss-averse newsvendor orders less than the profit-maximizing quantity. Moreover,...

Drawing on data from 916 Division 1 men’s college hockey games played during a recent six-year period in the Western Collegiate Hockey Association (WCHA), we find evidence that positive momentum within 458 two-game series does not exist when controlling for team quality. We find that neither...

This paper analyzes gender differences in the disposition effect in an experiment based on Weber and Camerer (1998). The results emphasize that female investors realize less capital losses, have significantly higher disposition effects and are more loss averse than men.

When employers can incur losses from the labor relationship in a gift exchange game, they offer lower wages on average than in a no-loss relationship. Taking employers’ risk of losing money into account, employees exert more effort per wage unit.

We show that in a modified Mortensen–Pissarides model the bargaining weights depend on the players’ loss-aversion parameters. These weights can hence be calibrated without resorting to an assessment of players’ bargaining powers, which have proved difficult to empirically establish.

Branch (2014) shows that the asymmetric preference of professional forecasters enhances the fit of the original Taylor rule with respect to recent US monetary policy. This paper investigates the stability of the Taylor rule with asymmetric preference under adaptive learning. We find that when...