An alternative is a Condorcet winner if it beats all other alternatives in a pairwise majority vote. A social choice correspondence is a Condorcet extension if it selects the Condorcet winners–and nothing else–whenever a Condorcet winner exists. It is well known that Condorcet extensions are...

Recent research on the Condorcet Jury Theorem has proven that informative voting (that is, voting according to one’s signal) is not necessarily rational. With two alternatives, rational voting typically leads to the election of the correct alternative, in spite of the fact that not all voters...

We consider an axiomatic characterization of the plurality rule, which selects the alternative(s) most preferred by the largest number of individuals. We strengthen the characterization result of Yeh [Yeh, C.-H., 2008. An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice...

We prove the following result which is equivalent to the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem: when there are at least 3 alternatives, for any unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, at any given profile if an individual’s top ranked alternative differs from the social choice, then she...

We propose a simple non-cooperative game model in which two fragmented teams compete to increase their performance. The theoretical framework is based on the theory of conflict. We show that, depending on the value of a parameter in the model, the power of the competing teams may be expressed as...

Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discussed. Here monotonicity means that if preferences update in such a way that they get closer to an outcome then at the new situation this outcome remains chosen. Strong monotonicity requires further...

Welfare economics relies on consequentialism even though many philosophers have questioned this assumption. Survey evidence, based on a representative sample in Sweden, is presented here suggesting that most people’s ethical perceptions are consistent with consequentialism.

International cross-section demand systems have not been tested on their ability to accurately predict within country consumption expenditures. This paper reports on such a validation exercise for the case of food budget share predictions across expenditure percentiles within Bangladesh.

We study the assignment of agents to clubs in a frictional market environment. Club entry is endogenous and clubs compete by posting reserve prices in a competing auctions game prior to the agents’ decisions regarding which club to visit. The competing auctions equilibrium is constrained...

The Condorcet rule on the domain of profiles at which there exists a unique Condorcet winner is the unique rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness.