We analyze a simultaneous screening problem in competition among top schools. The model predicts that when the second best school has similar prestige to the best one it could attract better students by choosing the same entrance examination date.

In a bargaining setting with asymmetrically informed, inequity-averse parties, a fully efficient mechanism (i.e., the double auction) exists if and only if compassion is strong. Less compassionate parties do not trade in the double auction in the limit of strong envy.

If a positive proportion of traders are naive (i.e., honestly reveal their types and bid/ask truthfully), then efficiency increases in a double auction with preplay communication. Presence of naive traders induces strategic traders to decrease the misrepresentation of their private information.

I show that bargaining impasse in Hörner and Vieille (2009) can be interpreted as the limit of bargaining delay: the maximal duration of the game increases unboundedly as the seller’s discount factor approaches the threshold level above which bargaining impasse occurs.

We compare dictator and impunity games. In impunity games, responders can reject offers but to no payoff consequence to proposers. Because proposers act under impunity, we should expect the same behavior across games, but experimentally observed behavior varies. Responders indeed exercise the...

We show that the Nash demand game has the fictitious play property. We also show that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Nash demand game.

The absence of simultaneous cycles is a sufficient condition for the existence of singleton cores. Acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the market is a minimal condition that guarantees the existence of singleton cores.

In this paper, we make use of a unique dataset collected at the central train station of the city of Kiel, Germany. Group tickets are used by individual proposers looking for co-travelers to share the ride with shortly before the train departure. The shared ride is offered for a fixed price. We...

We establish a link between cooperative and competitive behavior. For every possible vector of weights of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists a market that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive payoff vector.

A new axiom, symmetry-based compromise, is introduced to study solutions to convex bargaining problems. It is shown that any efficient solution that is also scale invariant and satisfies symmetry-based compromise must be Nash.