We report an experiment in which subjects are not indifferent between real-money lotteries implemented with randomization devices that are equivalent under the Reduction Axiom. Instead, choice behavior is consistent with subjective distortion of conditional probability, and this persists in...

This paper extends the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model to compare two banking economies: one with a competitive banking system and another with a monopolistic one. It is shown that a competitive banking system is more fragile than a monopolistic one in the sense that the parameter set...

In this note, we consider the effect on equity premiums of a representative household’s subjective expectations during disasters. In particular, we focus on the effect of doubt during disasters. We derive analytical solutions of equity premiums in the model of power utility function and...

We analyze a simple model of an asset market, in which a large rational trader interacts with “noise speculators” who seek short-run speculative gains, and become active following a prolonged episode of mispricing relative to the asset’s fundamental value. The model gives rise to price...

We hypothesize the existence of a slow-moving fad component in art prices. Using unique panel survey data on art market participants’ confidence levels in the outlook for a set of artists, we find that sentiment indeed predicts short-term returns.

In this paper, we quantify the dynamics of absolute excess returns on stock markets depending on three factors: the average of the absolute excess return, the level of the stock price, and stock market volatility. We also argue that the absolute excess return can be regarded as an empirical...

We compare post-financing stock performance for debt-issuing portfolio with equity-issuing one in Taiwan to identify whether firms’ financing decisions were driven by managerial optimism or market timing. Our result supports corporate financing decisions in Taiwan are driven by managerial...

This experiment shows that varying the commission received by financial advisors strongly influences insurance purchase.

We add social norms into Laffont’s mechanism designed for environmental risk. We find with endogenous social norms and asymmetric information about personal norms, the optimal contract induces more (less) effort from the “green” (“brown”) firm.

Hyperbolic discounting with naiveté is widely believed to provide a better explanation than exponential discounting of why people borrow so much and why they wait so long to save for retirement. We reach a different set of conclusions. We show that if financial planning is enriched to include...