This paper extends the eductive learning approach in settings with non-atomistic agents. It shows the connection between the characterization of rationalizable sets by Basu (1991) and the seminal result by Guesnerie (1992) in the context of Cournot oligopoly models.

A landmark result in the optimal monetary policy design literature is that fundamental-based interest rate rules invariably lead to rational expectations equilibria (REE) that are not stable under adaptive learning. In this paper, we make a novel information assumption that private agents cannot...

The notion of optimized rational behavior in the formation of expectations is used in this note to study the dynamics of a simple macroeconomic model. In a setting where departures from stability are not possible under perfect foresight, the selection of an optimal degree of rationality may lead...

We demonstrate theoretically and illustrate the implications of assuming power utility when the true function is of the expo-power form. Empirical results can appear to be consistent with cumulative prospect theory when they are in fact generated from a Markowitz model.

The purpose in this letter is to demonstrate, employing two parametric forms of the Markowitz model of utility, that heterogeneity of preferences of Markowitz agents can contribute towards an explanation of why lotteries typically have multiple rather than single prizes.

We examine asymmetry in the loss function of Japanese corporate executives in their output growth forecasts and test for rationality of the forecasts under the assumption of a possibly asymmetric loss function. We find evidence of asymmetry and support for rationality under an asymmetric loss...

In this paper, we consider a model where producers set their prices based on their prediction of the aggregated price level and an exogenous variable, which can be a demand or a cost-push shock. To form their expectations, they use OLS-type econometric learning with bounded memory. We show that...

In this paper, we examine a free entry aggregative game where agents can be asymmetric. We show the existence of a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of this game. The proof is a constructive one and therefore we provide a method to derive a subgame perfect equilibrium within a reasonable...

In this paper, we study the functional central limit theorem for ARMA–GARCH processes. We prove that, under the finite second moment assumption, the stationary ARMA–GARCH process is geometricallyL2-NED and that the functional central limit theorem holds.

We perform comparative statics for a general model of asymmetric oligopoly and derive a concise formula for the response of one firm to a marginal change in its rival’s strategic variable, taking into account the responses of all other firms. We obtain the conditions under which the sign of...