We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial competition, to the vertical structure of an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded.

We show how, in an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded, a vertical merger with a monopoly upstream will induce each downstream firm (inside and out of the merger) to deviate from the socially optimal location.

We look at the implications of a cross-border merger upstream in a vertically related industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded.

We construct a model of exchange rate target zones that allows the stochastic process, with a closed-form general solution, to include the possibility of lagged response of fundamentals.

In this paper I present evidence indicating systematic differences in costs of adjustment associated with the introduction of new capital across groups of firms that differ in the factor-intensity of their products.

We construct a game theoretic model of an oligarchic economy that potentially could be targeted by smart international sanctions. Oligarchs in this economy provide support for their leader, a strong man and potentially an autocrat, in return for favors that results in having income higher than...

We show that wage behavior as well as the skilled-unskilled wage gap depend on elasticity of import demand. Although, our analysis is in the spirit of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, factor intensity plays no role in our results.

We construct a model whereby stock exchanges take a new role as an information intermediary, notably absent in their roles. We show that exchanges differentiate themselves at subgame perfect equilibrium and will not race to the top or to the bottom.