It is standard in experimental economics to use decontextualized designs where payoff structures are presented using neutral language. Here we show that cooperation in such a neutrally framed Prisoner’s Dilemma is equivalent to a PD framed as contributing to a cooperative endeavour....

We extend Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2004) by considering all-purpose public goods that are beneficial to both producers and consumers. Horizontal externality (resp. vertical externality) exerted by tax competition will not necessarily lead to inefficient outcomes.

We investigate parochial altruism, the combination of in-group altruism and out-group hostility, in an experimental conflict game preceded by a prisoner’s dilemma. Our data are consistent with parochial altruism, but cannot be explained by in-group pro-sociality or out-group hostility alone.

In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable allocation. These new conditions exploit the fact that one side of the market has strict preferences over individual contracts.

We demonstrate that Big-Five personality traits are stable for working-age adults over a four-year period. Mean population changes are small and constant across age groups. Intra-individual changes are generally unrelated to adverse life events and are not economically meaningful.

We use the supply chain matching framework to study the effects of firm exit. We show that the exit of an initial supplier or end consumer has monotonic effects on the welfare of initial suppliers and end consumers but may simultaneously have positive and negative effects on intermediaries....

When capital is sunk after it is invested, a host government facing heterogeneous foreign investors has a strong incentive to reduce preferential taxes over time in order to attract less eager investors while fully expropriating past investors. This induces investors to wait rather than invest...

A multinational firm’s location decision depends not only on the host country’s tax and trade policies. Another country can use trade policy to influence the firm’s location decision. When countries form a free trade agreement (FTA), FDI destruction is possible.

We examine an entry-deterrence model in the commons. We investigate in which contexts asymmetric information among firms becomes welfare improving, and in which settings an uninformed regulator may prefer to assess and disseminate information about the available stock among firms.