This paper studies the ambiguous welfare effects of compatibility in a platform market with endogenous content provision. Compatibility can be particularly harmful if it leads to reduced content but can be beneficial if content is sufficiently increased.

This paper investigates the impacts of competition structures on firms’ incentives for adopting strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) certified by a Non-Governmental Organization. We show that, to induce firms to adopt certified ECSR, the certifier will set a standard...

This paper builds a theory of endogenous role distribution (leader, follower, and Nash player) and of endogenous choice for the type of competition strategy (price and quantity) in a product differentiated duopoly model. We examine an extended game by adding a pre-play stage in which duopoly...

We model platform competition in a market where products are characterized by cross network externalities. Consumers differ in their valuation of these externalities. Although the exogenous set-up is entirely symmetric, we show that platform competition induces a vertical differentiation...

Studies of micro-level price datasets find more frequent small price increases than decreases, which can be explained by consumer inattention because time-constrained shoppers might ignore small price changes. Recent empirical studies of the link between shopping behavior and price attention...

This paper sets up a three-stage (R&D, technology licensing, and output) oligopoly game in which only one of the firms undertakes a cost-reducing R&D and may license the developed technology to the others by means of a two-part tariff (i.e., a per-unit royalty and an upfront fee) contract. It is...

Focusing on a panel of unlisted firms from transition economies, we observe that only firms facing low irreversibility exhibit high and significant investment-cash flow sensitivities. Our findings provide a new explanation for why some financially constrained firms may exhibit low sensitivities.

In response to the imposition of steep enough sanctions for employing illegal migrants, the firm reassigns managers from supervision of production to verification of the legality of its workforce. This impedes production efficiency, reduces wages, and hurts the native workers.

The liability of smallness assumption suggests that smaller firms face higher exit risks. However, does it apply during crises? We show that during downturns size reduces firms’ exit risk by less; the hazard rate increases more rapidly in size.

This paper analyses the disparity regarding the sign of the investment–uncertainty relationship in models of investment under symmetric adjustment costs. That sign is determined by the shape of the profit function, which is related to the nature of demand shocks.