Recent work about risk preferences at the micro level mainly finds that changes in liquid wealth over time do not affect or have a positive effect on the liquid risky asset share. This paper embeds riskless noncapital income in standard portfolio choice models, and shows that exogenous...

In spite of their importance, third or higher moments of portfolio returns are often neglected in portfolio construction problems due to the computational difficulties associated with them. In this paper, we propose a new robust mean–variance approach that can control portfolio skewness and...

In this note we show the following result of Dybvig (1995) is valid for a general von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function: for an agent who does not tolerate a decline in consumption, the optimal investment out of discretionary wealth (in excess of the perpetuity value of current consumption)...

We prove a relationship between the bordered Hessian in an equality constrained extremum problem and the Hessian of the equivalent lower-dimension unconstrained problem. This relationship can be used to derive principal minor conditions for the former from the relatively simple and accessible...

When risk averse forecasters are presented with risk neutral proper scoring rules, they report probabilities whose ratios are shaded towards 1. If elicited probabilities are used as inputs to decision-making, naive elicitors may violate first-order stochastic dominance.

This paper proposes a homotopy method for implementing counterfactual experiments in empirical models with multiple equilibria. A key assumption is that the equilibrium selection function does not jump discontinuously between equilibria as we continuously change the structural parameters.

We investigate the role personality plays in Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (FRPD) games. Even after controlling for demographic factors such as race, course of study, and cognitive ability, we find that cooperative behavior is significantly related to the Big Five personality trait...

We consider preference evolution in a class of conflict models with finite populations. We show that whereas aggregate conflict effort is always the same in evolutionary equilibrium, larger populations have greater individual subjective costs of conflict effort.

We build on Mason and Weeds’ (2010) model of duopoly investment under uncertainty by allowing high initial values of the profit shock as in Huisman and Kort (1999). Persistent first-mover advantage increases the likelihood of immediate simultaneous investment. In contrast with previous models...

One can restructure institutions, but if individual-level motivations for corrupt behavior are not understood, these restructuring may not be effective. We introduce an evolutionary-game modeling to deal with the problem of corruption driven by imitative behavior.