We study information transmission between informed experts and an uninformed decision-maker who only takes binary decisions. In the single expert case, we show that information transmission can only be relatively poor. Hence, even sophiscated communication games do not yield equilibria which (ex...

About 90% of entrepreneurs in the high-tech and professional service industries were previously employed in the same sector. In this paper, we provide a theory for how aspiring entrepreneurs choose an employer. We contrast 'transparent' employers (or firms) promoting personal accountability and...

We provide a theory for career choices of employees willing to become entrepreneurs and facing credit constraints. We show that they need a sufficient mix of reputation and financial capital. We consider their choice to work for transparent or opaque firms. Transparent firms disclose more...

In our context, a good-reputation manager favors risk when being perceived as good allows to be promoted while risk is observable but not verifiable. Indeed, it renders more difficult the learning process regarding her talent. In turn, this lowers her level of effort since the extent to which...

We analyze the role of professional reputation in the transition to entrepreneurial activity when credit is rationed. We study an employee's willingness to allow the market to learn information about talent by choosing more or less informative projects. This choice impacts the employee's...

This paper studies corporate risk management in a context of financial constraints and imperfect competition in the product market. The paper shows that interactions between firms affect their hedging strategies. As a general rule, firms' hedging demands decrease with the correlation between...