In an environment where companies are subject to losing professional knowledge, education is faced with the transformation of learning environments. Its more or less formalized features reveal the difficulty of the transmission due to the tacit nature of the issues. Organizational intelligence...

The legal protection of knowledge has become a major asset for compagnies seeking to go beyond the constraints of place and space traning. What legal framework can be applied to the training provided in a digital environment? According to an exploratory process conducted with a sample of ten...

It is shown that it is possible to construct a disequilibrium microeconomics in which agents react to the evidence of disequilibrium (inventories, nonnormal ratio of capacity utilization, etc.). In a one good model, we describe the set of fixed points In addition to normal equilibrium, two...

Why do investors keep different opinions even though they learn from their own failures and successes? Why do investors keep different opinions even though they observe each other and learn from their relative failures and successes? We analyze beliefs dynamics when beliefs result from a very...

In this paper, we show that behavioral features can be obtained at a group level when the individuals of the group are heterogeneous enough. More precisely, starting from a standard model of Pareto optimal allocations, with expected utility maximizers and exponential dis- counting, but allowing...

We test the hypothesis that "genuine" or "convincing" smiling is a costly signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust. Potential trustees in a trust game made video clips for viewing by potential trusters before the latter decided whether to send them...

The aim of the paper is to analyze the impact of heterogeneous beliefs in an otherwise standard competitive complete market economy. The construction of a consensus probability belief, as well as a consensus consumer, are shown to be valid modulo an aggregation bias, which takes the form of a...

We study information transmission between informed experts and an uninformed decision-maker who only takes binary decisions. In the single expert case, we show that information transmission can only be relatively poor. Hence, even sophiscated communication games do not yield equilibria which (ex...