We prove the existence of the maxmin of zero-sum recursive games with one sided information.

We investigate a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which the players have an asymmetric information on the random payoff. We prove that the game has a value and characterize this value in terms of dual viscosity solutions of some second order Hamilton-Jacobi equation.

We consider the asymptotic value of two person zero sum repeated games with general evaluations of the stream of stage payoffs. We show existence for incomplete information games, splitting games and absorbing games. The technique of proof consists in embedding the discrete repeated game into a...

The motivation of this paper comes from repeated games with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. It concerns the existence, for any payoff function, of a particular equilibrium (called completely revealing) allowing each player to learn the state of nature. We consider thus an...

This article is devoted to a survey of results for differential games obtained through Viability Theory. We recall the basic theory for differential games (obtained in the 1990s), but we also give an overview of recent advances in the following areas : games with hard constraints, stochastic...

This paper is devoted to regret lower bounds in the classical model of stochastic multi-armed bandit. A well-known result of Lai and Robbins, which has then been extended by Burnetas and Katehakis, has established the presence of a logarithmic bound for all consistent policies. We relax the...

This paper deals with inertia functions in control theory introduced in Aubin, Bernardo and Saint-Pierre (2004, 2005) and their adaptation to dynamical games. The inertia function associates with any initial state-control pair the smallest of the worst norms over time of the velocities of the...

We study the existence of uniform correlated equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games. The correlation devices that we use are either autonomous (they base their choice of signal on previous signals, but not on previous states or actions) or stationary (their choice is independent of any data and...

We show on a 4x4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibria, and this for an open set of games. This holds for the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying some standard...

This paper considers GARCH(1,1) models in which the time-varying coefficients are functions of the realizations of an exogenous stochastic process. Time series generated by this model are in general nonstationary. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the existence of non-explosive...