This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent's strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of...

This paper presents a new methodology aimed at building institutional indicators. Up to now, all the available indicators have relied on an analysis of the supply of legal protection. Conversely we propose here a methodology based on the analysis of the demand for legal protection, as it is...

Questioning about game theory as an institutionalism theory could seem unsound at first glance. In game theory, the very basic concept of players’ strategies is quite individualistic and really independent on any social constraint and other institutional consideration. On another hand, the...

The process of development is linked to the rise of an integrated and competitive economy and polity that allow a maximal division of labor and innovation. This process relies on two intertwined dynamics. First, in the establishment of the rule of law, legal instruments are appropriated by those...

Since the eighties, nuclear safety has been discussed in organizational studies and constitutes nowadays a specific stream with several standpoints. Regarding the reliability of nuclear plants, the nuclear safety literature has emphasized on the crucial role of individuals and human factors....