The article shows how Jean-Francois Mertens contributed to the development of game theory and microeconomics as we know them today. Along with about 80 articles, Mertens's topics go from the formulation of Bayesian decision making in games with incomplete information to the foundations of cost...

For any TU game and any ranking of players, the set of all preimputations compatible with the ranking, equipped with the Lorenz order, is a bounded join semi-lattice. Furthermore, the set admits as sublattice the S-Lorenz core intersected with the region compatible with the ranking. This result...

This note analyzes some properties of optional two-part pricing in a two-type economy. First, the optimal contracts along the Paretian frontier are described. Then, the duality relation between the Rawlsian program and the discriminating monopoly is demonstrated. Last, this property is used to...

We test the hypothesis that smiles perceived as honest serve as a signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust. Potential trustees (84 participants from Toulouse, France) made two video clips averaging around 15 seconds for viewing by potential senders...

In a committee where cooperative voting occurs, effectivity functions describe the blocking power of coalitions. It is a binary relation that says for each coalition T and each subset of outcomes B whether or not T can force the final outcome within B. The corresponding cooperative stability...

We consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus extends the assignment game introduced by Shapley and...

Different kinds of asymmetries between players can occur in core allocations, in that case the stability of the concept is questioned. One remedy consists in selecting robust core allocations. We review, in this note, results that all select core allocations in NTU games with different concepts...

We prove that a natural monopoly can set subsidy free pricing and sustainable pricing schedules in general economic environment. The setting is a multiproduct and multiple agent contestable market where demands are elastic and where rivals can enter the sub-markets composed by a set of the...

We provide some existence results of stable pricings for natural monopoly as defined in the theory of contestable markets. The main addings are based on the assumption of separated markets and the possibilities of entries. We borrow tools from cooperative game theory. Following the work of...