Showing 1 - 10 of 14
We present a comprehensive theory of large non-anonymous games in which agents have a name and a determinate social-type and/or biological trait to resolve the dissonance of a (matching-pennies type) game with an exact pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with finite agents, but without one when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009364901
We present proofs, based on the Shapley-Folkman theorem, of the convexity of the range of a strongly continuous, finitely additive measure, as well as that of an atomless, countably additive measure. We also present proofs, based on diagonalization and separation arguments respectively, of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009390650
In the setting of non-cooperative game theory strategic negligibility of individual agents or diffuseness of information has been modelled as a non-atomic measure space typically the unit interval endowed with Lebesgue measure However recent work has shown that with uncountable action sets as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005434992
We provide a detailed portfolio analysis for a financial market with an atomless continuum of assets. In the context of an exact arbitrage pricing theory (EAPT), we go beyond the characterization of the existence of important portfolios (normalized riskless, mean, cost, factor and mean-variance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005435003
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005435031
not available
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005435038
For market with an atomless continuum of assets, we formulate the intuitive idea of a "well-diversified" portfolio, and present a notion of "exact arbitrage", strictly weaker than the more conventional notion of "asymptotic arbitrage", and necessary and sufficient for the validity of an APT...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005435039
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005435043
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005628998
not available
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005265285