We study a labor market in which principals and agents must search for a trading partner, and agents have private information about the value of a match. We show that competitive pressure can induce agents to lie and over-state the value of the match. This leads to insufficient frictional...

We study a labor market in which principals and agents must search for a trading partner, and agents have private information about the value of a match. We show that competitive pressure can induce agents to lie and overstate the value of the match. This leads to insufficient frictional...

We study how private information is used in a search market with non-transferable utility. We show that competitive pressure can turn privately informed agents into "yes men" who, against their own better judgement, mimic behavior that prior information suggests is more valuable. This is more...

Empirical tests of the deterrence hypothesis - the idea that crime can be deterred through changes in the costs or benefits derived from committing crime - typically focus on estimation of the relationship between current crime rates and contemporaneous measures of economic conditions,...

I describe algorithms for drawing from distributions using adaptive Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, introduce a Mata function for per- forming adaptive MCMC, amcmc(), and a suite of functions amcmc_*() allowing an implementation of adaptive MCMC using a structure. To ease use in...

We examine whether advertising increases household debt by studying the initial expansion of television in the 1950’s. Exploiting the idiosyncratic spread of television across markets, we use microdata from the Survey of Consumer Finances to test whether households with early access to...