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Minimum participation rules for the provision of public goods

Gerber, Anke; Neitzel, Jakob; Wichardt, Philipp C. - In: European Economic Review 64 (2013) C, pp. 209-222

This paper considers the endogenous formation of an institution to provide a public good. If the institution governs only its members, players have an incentive to free ride on the institution formation of others and the social dilemma is simply shifted to a higher level. Addressing this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729784

On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria

Carlsson, Hans; Wichardt, Philipp C. - In: Economics letters 115 (2012) 3, pp. 504-508

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009967267

Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining

Wichardt, Philipp C.; Schunk, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics letters 103 (2009) 1, pp. 33-35

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008231982

Overconfidence can improve an agent's relative and absolute performance in contests

Ludwig, Sandra; Wichardt, Philipp C.; Wickhorst, Hanke - In: Economics letters 110 (2011) 3, pp. 193-197

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008843247

Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining

Wichardt, Philipp C.; Schunk, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics letters 103 (2009) 1, pp. 33-36

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008892204

How burning money requires a lot of rationality to be effective

Seel, Christian; Wichardt, Philipp C. - In: Economics letters 115 (2012) 1, pp. 111-114

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009838645