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Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence
Feess, Eberhard; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - In: Economics letters 104 (2009) 2, pp. 69-71
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008270146
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Liability and information transmission: The advantage of negligence based rules
Feess, Eberhard; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - In: Economics letters 92 (2006) 1, pp. 63-67
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007264711
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Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence
Feess, Eberhard; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - In: Economics letters 104 (2009) 2, pp. 69-72
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008899067
Cover Image
Liability and information transmission : the advantage of negligence based rules
Feess, Eberhard; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - In: Economics letters 92 (2006) 1, pp. 63-67
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003336509
Cover Image
Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence
Feess, Eberhard; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - In: Economics letters 104 (2009) 2, pp. 69-71
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003870163
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Why costless auditing may reduce social welfare
Feess, Eberhard; Schumacher, Christoph - In: Economics letters 90 (2006) 3, pp. 407-411
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006747811
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Delegated expertise - when are good projects bad news?
Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - In: Economics letters 82 (2004) 1, pp. 77-82
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001877567
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Delegated expertise-when are good projects bad news?
Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - In: Economics letters 82 (2004) 1, pp. 77-82
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006758759
Cover Image
Why costless auditing may reduce social welfare
Feess, Eberhard; Schumacher, Christoph - In: Economics letters 90 (2006) 3, pp. 407-411
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003295330