A game with precedence constraints is a TU game with restricted cooperation, where the set of feasible coalitions is a distributive lattice, hence generated by a partial order on the set of players. Its core may be unbounded, and the bounded core, which is the union of all bounded faces of the...

Cooperation structures without any a priori assumptions on the combinatorial structure of feasible coalitions are studied and a general theory for marginal values, cores and convexity is established. The theory is based on the notion of a Monge extension of a general characteristic function,...

In this paper, we present a generalization of the concept of balanced game for finite games. Balanced games are those having a nonempty core, and this core is usually considered as the solution of the game. Based on the concept of k-additivity, we define the so-called k-balanced games and the...

The implementation of Sustainable Development (SD) within an Organization is a difficult task. This is due to the fact that it is difficult to deal with conflicting and incommensurable aspects such as environmental, economic and social dimensions. In this paper we have used a Multi-Criteria...

The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to...

An extension to the classical notion of core is the notion of k-additive core, that is, the set of k-additive games which dominate a given game, where a k-additive game has its Möbius transform (or Harsanyi dividends) vanishing for subsets of more than k elements. Therefore, the 1-additive core...