Based on first-hand account, this paper offers evidence on price setting and price adjustment mechanisms that were illegally employed under the Soviet planning and rationing regime. The evidence is anecdotal, and is based on personal experience during the years 1960–1971 in the Republic of...

We examine the influence of social capital and various prevailing beliefs on household repayment behavior in Europe, after accounting for household-specific characteristics and country differences in institutions. Arrears are more common among households living in regions with dense corruption...

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the international naval mission in the Gulf of Aden from 2008 to 2010, both in terms of its counter-piracy and its counter-terrorism objectives. We draw on arguments developed in the literature of terrorism and law and economics, detailed statistical...

This paper analyzes a model in which a firm's compliance with regulation is monitored by a supervisor. The supervisor exerts costly, unobservable effort to raise his inspection intensity, which leads to moral hazard. A non-compliant firm may exert effort in avoidance to reduce the probability of...

In this paper we measure perceptions of incorrect behavior or ‘small crime’, based on a questionnaire administered to a large representative sample from the Dutch population. In the questionnaire we ask the respondents to rate the severity or justifiability of a number of small crimes. We...

This paper contributes to the literature on specific deterrence by addressing the issue of selecting adolescents into adult and juvenile law systems. In Germany, different from the U.S. and most other countries, turning a critical cutoff age does not cause a sharp discontinuity from juvenile to...

We analyze survey evidence on individuals' willingness to sanction law violations – such as evading taxes, drunk driving and fare dodging – by disapproval or social exclusion. Our data show that people condition their willingness to sanction a norm violation on their belief about its...

We study how corruption affects economic activities of households in rural Liberia. A proxy of corruption of community leaders is obtained by directly monitoring the diversion of inputs associated with a development project. We measure quantities of these inputs twice; before and after the chief...

We experimentally investigate the effects of group size on behavior and outcomes in a multilateral bargaining game. Using a Baron–Ferejohn protocol, our main interest is in the extent of costly delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement). We investigate the effects of group...

This article describes a large number of contestants with high and low levels of talent who individually decide to enter a contest or take their heterogeneous outside options. We derive a critical condition for which only high types, only low types or both types participate in the contest. If a...