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experiments. This has been taken as evidence for internal motivations such as guilt aversion or preference for promise keeping … that communication increases the overall level of cooperation in our experiments with double-blind payoff procedures …. However, we also find no evidence that communication impacts cooperation in our experiments with single-blind payoff …
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high contributions. No deception is used and the data cohere well both internally and with other public goods experiments … implements a new experimental design, the Conditional Information Lottery, which offers all the benefits of deception without … actually deceiving anyone. The design should be suitable for most economics experiments, and works by a modification of an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005678686
counseled to lift their de facto prohibition against deception to capture its potential benefits. To the extent that this … on a discussion of the methodological costs and benefits of deception, we conclude that experimental economists …' prohibition of deception is a sensible convention that economists should not abandon. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002 …
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predictive under general conditions and to organize data well in previous experiments meant to test other concepts. In a new …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988989
Charness and Dufwenberg (Am. Econ. Rev. 101(4):1211–1237, <CitationRef CitationID="CR10">2011</CitationRef>) have recently demonstrated that cheap-talk communication raises efficiency in bilateral contracting situations with adverse selection. We replicate their main finding and extend their design to include competition between agents....</citationref>
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Li (Am Econ Rev 107(11):3257–3287, 2017) introduces a theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy, to be used as a refinement in mechanism design. This notion is supported by experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending-clock auction than the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501391