The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of agents has a profitable...

In this paper the problem of optimal derivative design, profit maximization and risk minimization under adverse selection when multiple agencies compete for the business of a continuum of heterogenous agents is studied. In contrast with the principal-agent models that are extended within, here...

Precedents can facilitate successful coordination within groups by reducing strategic uncertainty, but they may lead to coordination failure when two groups with diverging precedents have to interact. This paper describes an experiment to explore how such coordination failure can be mitigated...

We present an experiment in which extrinsic information (signals) may generate sunspot equilibria. The underlying coordination game has a unique symmetric non-sunspot equilibrium, which is also risk-dominant. Other equilibria can be ordered according to risk dominance. We compare treatments with...

We prove that the global game selection in all 3 x 3 payoff-symmetric supermodular games is independent of the noise structure. As far as we know, all other proofs of noise independence of such games rely on the existence of a so-called monotone potential (MP) maximiser. Our result is more...

Many social networks have the following properties: (i) a short average distance between any two individuals; (ii) a high clustering coefficient; (iii) segregation patterns; the presence of (iv) brokers and (v) hubs. (i) and (ii) define a small world network. This paper develops a strategic...

In this note, I study the roles of value heterogeneity - i.e., agents are heterogeneous in terms of values of nonrival information thay they possessed - in determining the shapes of two-way flow Strict Nash networks when small amount of decay is present. I do so by extending the two-way flow...

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...

This paper brings together analyses of two-way flow Strict Nash networks under exclusive player heterogeneity assumption and exclusive partner heterogeneity assumption. This is achieved through examining how the interactions between these two assumptions influence important properties of Strict...

We examine patterns of acquiring non-native languages in a model with two languages and two populations with heterogeneous learning skills, where every individual faces a binary choice of learning the foreign language or refraining from doing so. We show that both interior and corner linguistic...