high clustering coefficient; (iii) segregation patterns; the presence of (iv) brokers and (v) hubs. (i) and (ii) define a … small world network. This paper develops a strategic network formation model where agents have heterogeneous knowledge of … the network: cognizant agents know the whole network, while ignorant ones are less knowledgeable. For a broad range of …

socially efficient level. We analyze the situation when the tragedy of the commons is embedded in a network of users and … exists a unique equilibrium. But when the users have concave values, the network structure matters. The exploitation at each … formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure. Next we characterize …

connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the … repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of … produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its …

This paper studies a non-cooperative model of network formation. Built upon the two-way flow model of Bala and Goyal …

that the completely connected network is stable, although, its exact structure, and thus contagion implications, is …

, I provide a proposition that generalizes the results of these two models by stating that: (i) Strict Nash network … network as in Billand et al (2011). This proposition requires that a certain restriction on link formation cost (called …

We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a … bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target …. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. The …

Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic … selects one equilibrium at a time. An agent's expected payoff is related to his position in the network, though no centrality …

Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network …’s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the … same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough …