Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler (1973), Rashid (1983), Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1999) and Podczeck (2007a). The level of generality of each of these existence results is...

We consider Salim Rashid's asymptotic version of David Schmeidler's theorem on the purification of Nash equilibria. We show that, in contrast to what is stated, player's payoff functions have to be selected from an equicontinuous family in order for Rashid's theorem to hold. That is, a bound on...

We study whether we can weaken the conditions given in Reny [4] and still obtain existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in quasiconcave normal form games, or, at least, existence of pure strategy ε -equilibria for all ε 0. We show by examples that there are: 1. quasiconcave, payoff secure...

We characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players (Mas-Colell (1984)) in terms of approximate equilibria of large finite games. For the concept of (; ) equilibrium in which the fraction of players not optimizing is less than we show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a...

We consider an asymptotic version of Mas-Colell's theorem on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large games. Our result states that, if players' payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous family, then all sufficiently large games have an pure, equilibrium for all gt; 0....

We show that for any discount factor, there is a natural number M such that all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the discounted repeated prisoners' dilemma can be obtained by subgame perfect equilibrium strategies with the following property: current play depends only on the number of the...

In a version of the Diamond and Dybvig [6] model with aggregate uncertainty, we show that there exists an equilibrium with the following properties: all consumers deposit at the bank, all patient consumers wait for the last period to withdraw, and the bank fails with strictly positive...

We argue that it is natural to study social institutions within the framework of standard game theory (i.e., only by resorting to concepts like players, actions, strategies, information sets, payoff functions, and stochastic processes describing the moves of nature, which constitute a stochastic...

We show that monetary trading is simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible in a natural framework. Furthermore, we will show that the utility for each economic agent is at least as big under the monetary system as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible...