The literature on executive compensation at banks has proceeded largely under the assumption that a single elasticity can adequately describe the sensitivity of executive pay to firm performance, but theories of performance-based pay and tournament pay suggest that this assumption may be...

The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value a firm's profit-generating potential as one force mitigating that risk taking. We argue that in the presence...

The market for U.S. Treasury securities operates around-the-clock from the three main trading centers of Tokyo, London, and New York. We examine this market for volatility spillovers using the methodology employed by Engle, Ito, and Lin (1990) for the foreign exchange market. We find meteor...

Beginning in 1998, U.S. commercial banks may determine their regulatory capital requirements for financial market risk exposure using value-at-risk (VaR) models i.e., models of the time-varying distributions of portfolio returns. Currently, regulators have available three hypothesis-testing...