This paper studies technology choice as a relevant aspect to be considered when analyzing price discrimination and welfare. Our results reinforce the traditional wisdom that an increase in output is a necessary condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare. But we also find that...

In this note I provide examples to show that, contrary to what is widely believed, when changing from an uniform price to a third-degree price discrimination situation, an improvement in welfare is possible with output reduction, if there is more than one firm.

The economic theory has proved that free entry is not always advantageous from a social welfare point of view. Fro instance, a number of inefficiencies can arise from free entry in the presence of fixed set-up costs. Then, an excessive number of firms can usually be settled in homogeneous produc...

We provide an example of a monopoly with Pigouvian second-degree price discrimination where unit taxes are Pareto superior to ad valorem taxes.

It has been proved that in an homogeneous product industry, price over marginal costs, business stealing, set up costs and free entry imply excess entry from the welfare point of view. The proof assumes identical firms. We show by example that with non-identical firms, those conditions are...

This paper compares the effects of unitary and ad valorem taxes in a homogeneous good market where two technologies are freely available. We find that, both in monopolies and Cournot oligopolies, unit taxes may be welfare superior to ad valorem taxes.

The classical Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model explains tax evasion behavior based on the probability of being discovered, the amount of the fine imposed and the level of risk aversion. Nonetheless, empirical studies show that the decision and the level of tax evasion depends also on non economic...

This paper presents a method to make measurable what was not: the discourses of politicians regarding decentralization. For this purpose, we develop a “matrix of arguments” and a set of indexes, and apply them to provide a snapshot of the politicians’ views on the “General Law of...

This paper proposes a model where an upstream monopolist sells an input to a downstream industry, which may alternatively acquire a perfect substitute for the monopolist's input from a competitive industry. By vertically integrating with a downstream firm, the upstream monopolist may charge a...

I analyze a sample of contracts for the acquisition of technology by Spanish firms, where I observe firm and technology characteristics, as well as the type of scheduled payments, whether fixed and/or variable. I find first that technology type influences the chances of the parties reaching an...