This paper presents two new axiomatizations of the Owen value for games with coalition structures. Two associated games are defined and a consistency axiom is required. The construction of the associated games presupposes that coalitions behave in an aggressive manner towards players who are not...

The aim of this paper is to present a new value of a cooperative game for the case of limited communication between players. The communication system we consider may be represented by a simple graph, that is, only pairwise meetings can occur and some of them are not permitted. An associated game...

We present a new extension of the Shapley value for games with communication structure,only pairwise meetings can occur when some of them are not permitted.The present extension is a new one and in particular it is di .erent from the Myerson value,from the position value,and from a previous...

In this work, a new axiomatization of the Shapley value is presented. An associated game is constructed which can also be interpreted as a perturbation of the original game. We define a sequence of games, when the term of order n, in this sequence, is the associated game of the term of order (n-1).

The aim of this paper is to present an approach to the middleman problem in the context of cooperative games when communication between players is graph-restricted. We consider a set of three axioms: linearity, dummy player and independence of non connected coalitions. These axioms are generally...

This paper presents two new axiomatizations of the Owen value for games with coalition structures. Other axiomatizations can be found in the literature: Owen (1977), Hart and Kurz (1983), and Winter (1992). The driving force of my axiomatization is a consistency axiom based on an associated...