This paper shows that, in a partially welfarist framework that permits discounting, per-period social evaluations can be consistent with a timeless social ordering only if social principles lead to the repugnant conclusion. The same result applies if per-period social evaluations are replaced by...

This paper analyzes variable-population social-evaluation principles in a framework where outcomes are uncertain. In a static model, we provide characterizations of expected-utility versions of Critical-Level Generalized Utilitarian rules.

Ce travail propose une methode d'analyse des representations sociales inspiree des theories du choix social. Nous nous appuyons sur une enquete realisee aupres d'usagers de la Camargue (Claeys-Mekdade et al. 1998). Nous analysons une question d'evocation soumise a un echantillon de 218 individus.

This note exhibits sufficient conditions concerning the skills of old workers ruling out overaccumulation stationnary equilibria in an OLG model with productive capital.

In economic two players games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash Equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule has to be amended if the game features strategic substituability.

We derive the asymptotic sampling distribution of various estimators frequently used to order distributions in terms of poverty, welfare and inequality. This includes estimators of most of the poverty indices currently in use, as well as estimators of the curves used to infer stochastic...