This paper proposes a model which intends to analyse the alternative between discrimination and mutualisation in insurance. We suppose there exists an observable (but initially hidden)variable, that predicts the level of risk of an individual. This variable can be observed through a testing...

This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a class of games of group formation. The use of potential allows for a characterisation of such an equilibrium.

This paper constructs an overlapping generations model of pollution externality wherein individuals are altruistically linked to their offspring as in Barro (1974). It is shown that steady state consumption may be a decreasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. Despite...

This paper presents an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities with a depollution technology. each agent concerned by the environmental degradation can volutary contribute in order to reduce it. Contributing to the environmental quality means financing depollution activities...

This paper studies within a dynamical model how decentralized individuals happen to elect non-proprietary standard. The issue is coordination because the individual benefit of adoption depends on whether other agents elect to adopt the same standard. It shows that whenthere are increasing...

En considerant que l'une des caracteristiques des problemes environnementaux est le niveau d'incertitudequi les accompagne, nous proposons d'etudier les effets de ces incertitudes sur les comportements de choix de portefeuille et d'epargne des agents. Nous montrons alors qu'a l'equilibre...

In economic two players games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash Equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule has to be amended if the game features strategic substituability.