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I consider a bargaining game in which, unlike the standard economic bargaining game (e.g. Rubenstein, 1982), only one player can make proposals. I also assume that the space of proposals is finite. Thus, the game is akin to (i) a CEO's proposing a hire who must be okayed by a board of directors,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012962763
As I document in this note, the party of a candidate for a U.S. House or Senate seat cannot be too out-of-line with his or her district. Specifically, if the district is more than 13 points different from the candidate's party (as judged by the most recent presidential election), then he or she...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013039946
Cai and Wang (2005) conducted a laboratory simulation of the Crawford-Sobel “strategic information transmission” game. The researchers were most interested in observing the amount of information that senders in the game transmitted to receivers. Consequently, they did not examine what I call...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989539
One of the most famous and outstanding formalizations of the Coase Conjecture is that by Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986). A peculiarity of their model — as well as all other examinations of the Coase Conjecture of which I am aware, including that by Coase himself — is that it assumes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012941825