We consider a rationing mechanism for selling a common-value object. Under certain conditions, the seller earns higher revenue from rationing the object, rather than holding a second-price auction. The mechanism is formally equivalent to dividing the object into k units, and allocating (1/k)...

We model an infinite horizon trading game of a limit order market with informed traders. Agents with a private and common value motive for trade randomly arrive in a market and may either post prices (submit limit orders) or accept posted prices (submit market orders). If their orders have not...

We consider a rationing mechanism for selling a common-value object. Under certain conditions, the seller earns higher revenue from rationing the object, rather than holding a second-price auction. The mechanism is formally equivalent to dividing the object into k units, and allocating (1/k)...

We consider a model of trade in a limit order market for a single asset, and examine the properties of the microstructure noise (i.e., the difference between the transaction price and the fundamental value). The asset has a common value; in addition, each trader has a private value for it....

We consider the role of product market competition in disciplining managers in a moral hazard setting. Competition has two effects on a firm. First, the expected revenue or the marginal benefit of effort declines, leading to weakly lower effort. Second, the cost of inducing high effort increases...

We provide an algorithm for solving for equilibrium in a dynamic limit order market. Our model relaxes many of the restrictive assumptions in the prior literature, leading to a more realistic framework for policy experiments on market design. We formulate a limit order market as a stochastic...