Less than 10 percent of executives in large publicly traded firms are women. On average female executives earn less than male executives, and hold less senior positions. They retire earlier. This paper is an empirical study of these differences based on panel of about 2,500 firms and 16,000...

Fewer women than men become executive managers. They earn less, hold more junior positions, and attrit faster. We compiled a large panel data set on executives and formed a career hierarchy to analyze promotion and compensation rates. Given executive rank and background, women are paid more than...

This paper addresses two questions: What accounts for the gender gap in labor-market outcomes? What are the driving forces behind the changes in the gender-labor-market out- comes over the period 1968–97? It formulates a dynamic general equilibrium model of labor supply, occupational sorting...

This article investigates the paradox of insider information and performance pay as it pertains to managerial compensation. The paradox is that managers are permitted to exploit their role as insiders for personal financial gain when simple directives issued by their board of directors could...

This paper develops and implements a semiparametric estimator for investi-gating, with panel data, the importance of human capital accumulation, nonsep-arable preferences of females and child care costs on females life-cycle fertility and labor supply behaviors. It presents a model in which the...

The theory of moral hazard predicts that since the activities of managers are hard to monitor directly, managerial compensation is tied to the profitability of the firms they manage. In this empirical study we investigate the hypothesis that the secular trends in managerial compensation can be...

This paper considers the effect of offer matching on labor market outcomes when the current employer has better information about his worker's productivity than potential employers. Previous research found that when current employers have better information than potential employers, the later...

In most models in which firms and workers learn about worker productivity through repeated observations of on-the-job performance, the amount of information revealed about workers is exogenously given and constant across jobs. In this paper, we examine what happens when the amount of information...