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Respect as an Incentive
Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
Assuming that people care not only about what others do but also on what others think, we study respect as a non-monetary source of motivation in a context where the length of the employment relationship is endogeneous. In our three-stage gift-exchange experiment, the employer can express...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008678679
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Wages or Fringes? Some Evidence on Trade-offs and Sorting
Eriksson, Tor; Kristensen, Nicolai - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
The two key predictions of hedonic wage theory are that there is a trade-off between wages and nonmonetary rewards and that the latter can be used as a sorting device by firms to attract and retain the kind of employees they desire. Empirical analysis of these topics are scarce as they require...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693836
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Saving Face and Group Identity
Eriksson, Tor; Mao, Lei; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2015
Are people willing to sacrifice resources to save one's and others' face? In a laboratory experiment, we study whether individuals forego resources to avoid the public exposure of the least performer in their group. We show that a majority of individuals are willing to pay to preserve not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011307331
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Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay : An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting
Villeval, Marie-Claire; Eriksson, Tor - 2004
Variable pay not only creates a link between pay and performance but may also help firms in attracting the more productive employees (Lazear 1986, 2000). However, due to lack of natural data, empirical analyses of the relative importance of the selection and incentive effects of pay schemes are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261940
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Self-selection and the efficiency of tournaments
Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2006
When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a … to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments. This paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether … allowing subjects to self-select into different payment schemes helps in reducing the variability of performance in tournaments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267611
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Respect as an incentive
Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2010
Assuming that people care not only about what others do but also on what others think, we study respect as a non-monetary source of motivation in a context where the length of the employment relationship is endogeneous. In our three-stage gift-exchange experiment, the employer can express...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277038
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Wages or fringes? Some evidence on trade-offs and sorting
Eriksson, Tor; Kristensen, Nicolai - 2010
The two key predictions of hedonic wage theory are that there is a trade-off between wages and nonmonetary rewards and that the latter can be used as a sorting device by firms to attract and retain the kind of employees they desire. Empirical analysis of these topics are scarce as they require...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286008
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Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments
Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a … to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments. This paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether … allowing subjects to self-select into different payment schemes helps in reducing the variability of performance in tournaments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763542
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Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting
Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
Variable pay not only creates a link between pay and performance but may also help firms in attracting the more productive employees (Lazear 1986, 2000). However, due to lack of natural data, empirical analyses of the relative importance of the selection and incentive effects of pay schemes are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763609
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Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence
Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703358