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Performance pay and multi-dimensional sorting: productivity, preferences and gender
Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin - 2006
overconfidence affect worker self-selection, in particular into tournaments. Fourth, risk averse workers prefer fixed payments and … into tournaments. Sixth, variable pay schemes attract men more than women, a difference that is partly explained by gender …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267618
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Performance Pay and Multi-dimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences and Gender
Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
overconfidence affect worker self-selection, in particular into tournaments. Fourth, risk averse workers prefer fixed payments and … into tournaments. Sixth, variable pay schemes attract men more than women, a difference that is partly explained by gender …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703774
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Emotions and Incentives
Kräkel, Matthias - 2004
analyzed by focusing on three incentive schemes that are frequently used in practice: tournaments, bonuses and piece rates. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262021
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Emotions and Incentives
Kräkel, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
analyzed by focusing on three incentive schemes that are frequently used in practice: tournaments, bonuses and piece rates. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703572
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Managerial Incentives and Favoritism in Promotion Decisions: Theory and Field Evidence
Berger, Johannes; Herbertz, Claus; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854767
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Do Tournaments with Superstars Encourage or Discourage Competition?
Babington, Michael; Goerg, Sebastian J.; Kitchens, Carl - 2017
To test and replicate the superstar effect reported by Brown (2011) we empirically study contests where a single …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011653483
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Managerial incentives and favoritism in promotion decisions: Theory and field evidence
Berger, Johannes; Herbertz, Claus; Sliwka, Dirk - 2011
This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278492
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Incentives versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep; van … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from … tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external … where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005700934
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Globalization and the Provision of Incentives Inside the Firm: The Effect of Foreign Competition
Cuñat, Vicente; Guadalupe, Maria - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the incentives faced by U.S. managers in the form of wage structures, promotion profiles, and job turnover. We use a panel of executives and measure foreign competition as import penetration. Using tariffs and exchange rates as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763446
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Resource allocation and firm scope
Friebel, Guido; Raith, Michael - 2006
We develop a theory of firm scope in which integrating two firms into one facilitates the allocation of resources, but leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the underlying agency problem. Moreover, the benefits and costs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268001