We examine an evolutionary model in which the primary source of "noise" that moves the model between equilibria is not random, arbitrarily improbable mutations but mistakes in learning. We find conditions under which the payoff-dominant equilibrium in a 2x2 game is selected by the model as well...

We examine an evolutionary model with "local interactions," so that some agents may be more likely to interact than others. We show that equilibrium strategy choices with given local interactions correspond to correlated equilibria of the underlying game, suggesting an new interpretation for...

We formulate a dynamic learning-and-adjustment model of a market in which sellers choose signals that potentitally reveal their types. If the dynamic process selects a unique limiting outcome, then that outcome must be an undefeated equilibrium; though to be undefeated does not suffice to be the...

We examine an evolutionary model in which the primary source of "noise" that moves the model between equilibria is not random, arbitrarily improbable mutations but mistakes in learning. We find conditions under which the payoff-dominant equilibrium in a 2 x 2 game is selected by the model as...

This paper examines circumstances under which subjectivity enhances the effectiveness of inductive reasoning. We consider agents facing a data generating process who are characterized by inference rules that may be purely objective (or data-based) or may incorporate subjective considerations....

Decision theory can be used to test the logic of decision making - one may ask whether a given set of decisions can be justified by a decision-theoretic model. Indeed, in principal-agent settings, such justifications may be required - a manager of an investment fund may be asked what beliefs she...